Old Habits: Sister Bernadette and the Potential Revival of Sentence Diagramming in Written Legal Advocacy by Eichhorn, Lisa A
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Law School
Fall 2016
Old Habits: Sister Bernadette and the Potential
Revival of Sentence Diagramming in Written Legal
Advocacy
Lisa A. Eichhorn
University of South Carolina - Columbia, eichhorn@law.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa Eichhorn, Old Habits: Sister Bernadette and the Potential Revival of Sentence Diagramming in Written Legal Advocacy, 13 Legal
Comm. & Rhetoric: JAWLD 79 (2016).
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880303 
www.alwd.org         www.alwd.org/lc&r
Fall 2016 / Volume 13
Old Habits: Sister Bernadette and the Potential Revival  
of Sentence Diagramming in Written Legal Advocacy
Lisa Eichhorn
A r t i c l e s  &  e s s A y s
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880303 
Old Habits
Sister Bernadette and the Potential Revival of
Sentence Diagramming in Written Legal Advocacy
Lisa Eichhorn*
Of course, we’re all guilty of venial syntactical sins.1
I. Introduction
The factual history in United States v. Rentz concerned “a split second
in time” during which Philbert Rentz fired a single bullet in Indian
Territory that passed through the body of one victim and then struck and
killed a second.2 As a result, the federal government charged Mr. Rentz
with assaulting one person and murdering another.3 Mr. Rentz also
received two separate, additional, charges of using a firearm to commit a
violent crime: one firearm charge stemming from the assault and the other
stemming from the murder.4
In 2015, the Tenth Circuit, en banc, addressed whether Mr. Rentz’s
single-shot scenario could indeed support two separate firearm charges
under 18 U.S.C. section 924(c), which is violated by “any person who,
during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a
firearm.”5 For Mr. Rentz, the difference between one and two convictions
under section 924(c) would mean the difference between receiving and
not receiving an additional mandatory, nonconsecutive sentence of
twenty-five years to life.6 In the end, the en banc court held that a single
use of a firearm can support only one charge of violating the statute, even
if that single use involves more than one additional crime.7 Thus, the court
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of
Law.
1 United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1355 (10th
Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
2 735 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2013), vacated en banc, 777
F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2015).
3 Id. 
4 Id.
5 United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (10th Cir.
2015) (en banc) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
6 Id. at 1107.
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of one of Mr. Rentz’s two firearm
charges under section 924(c).8
As a veteran teacher of legal writing, what drew me to the Rentz case
was neither the tragic and improbable fact scenario nor the high-stakes
complexities of section 924(c). Instead, what really grabbed me was the
illustration, in the en banc opinion, of the statutory language in an old-
fashioned sentence diagram: 
“Visualized this way,” wrote Judge Neil Gorsuch for the majority, “it’s
hard to see how the total number of charges might ever exceed the
number of uses . . . . [Y]ou cannot use a firearm during and in relation to
crimes of violence more than the total number of times you have used a
firearm.”9
Judge Gorsuch’s illustration follows a sentence-diagramming pattern
once commonly taught in many American schools but now largely
abandoned.10 This nearly lost art is recalled with fondness by author Kitty
Burns Florey in Sister Bernadette’s Barking Dog, her ode to the “distinctly
unsexy”11 art of representing the grammatical relationships in a sentence
using horizontal, vertical, and slanted lines, as taught to her sixth-grade
Catholic-school class in the 1950s by Sister Bernadette: “It was a bit like
art, a bit like mathematics. It was much more than words uttered, or
words written on a piece of paper: it was a picture of language.”12
7 Id. at 1115.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1110 (emphasis in original).
10 See KITTY BURNS FLOREY, SISTER BERNADETTE’S
BARKING DOG 152 (2006) (“Diagramming isn’t dead—it’s
just resting. The practice is in the process of recovering from
the steep slide into marginality that began in the 1960s.”).
This article takes no position on whether students should
learn traditional sentence diagramming in schools.
11 Id. at 24. 
12 Id. at 14–15.
80 LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 13 / 2016
Given the rise of e-filing and of software that makes it easier than ever
to create images and insert them into documents, this lost art may be due
for a revival in written legal advocacy. After all, if an en banc federal
appellate court can use the lowly sentence diagram to explain, or perhaps
justify,13 its interpretation of a statute, then there should be at least an
occasional place for sentence diagrams of various styles in legal briefs that
make statutory-interpretation arguments. 
Indeed, a small number of briefs, some quite recent, have included
sentence diagrams to buttress arguments related to the interpretation of
statutes.14 Drawing on a study of both Rentz and of several twenty-first-
century federal appellate briefs that include such diagrams, this article
posits that while sentence diagrams can, in a limited set of cases, add to
the persuasive force of a statutory-interpretation argument,15 the diagrams
13 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 8 (1993) (arguing that, in difficult cases, “linguistic analysis [is]
especially tempting for judges to use as justification for their decisions, even in cases where the judge is motivated by a very
different agenda”).
14 I found briefs containing sentence diagrams primarily by searching WestlawNext for references to “sentence diagram” and
various combinations of those two words within four words of each other. Of course, the search results included judicial
opinions or briefs that referred to the concept of diagramming a sentence but did not contain an actual diagram. Other
results were opinions or briefs that allowed me to confirm the existence of an actual sentence diagram in the record.
Even where a judicial opinion confirmed that the record somewhere contained a sentence diagram, the WestlawNext
database did not always include the diagram-containing brief itself. Even when WestlawNext contained the brief, the PDF of
the brief in the database did not necessarily include the actual diagram (as opposed to WestlawNext’s notice that “tabular or
graphic material is not displayable”). The lack of a PDF on WestlawNext was especially common with respect to older cases
and state—as opposed to federal—cases. For some federal cases, I was able to find the PDF of the diagram-containing brief
on PACER, even if WestlawNext did not include the same PDF. 
Using this method, I was able to confirm the existence of diagram-containing briefs in about twenty cases, in fora
ranging from the Fifth Circuit to the Oregon Workers’ Compensation Board. The majority of these briefs date from 2005
onward—indeed, eight range from 2009 to 2014—perhaps because advances in word processing have made it easier to create
diagrams in recent years.
My research thus turned up only some unknown percentage of all of the diagram-containing briefs that have ever been
filed across the country. First, some briefs no doubt have included a diagram but have not used a phrase like “sentence
diagram” in the text. For example, a brief may introduce a diagram with words like, “We may think of the provision as illus-
trated below.” If that brief led to a judicial opinion, the opinion may not have referred to the diagram at all, or it may have
referred to the diagram without using phrases like “sentence diagram.” My research would have missed such cases. Second,
even if a brief used the phrase “sentence diagram” in introducing such a diagram, WestlawNext may not contain the brief,
especially if it was filed at the trial-court level or if the brief is more than a couple of decades old. If the brief did not lead to a
judicial opinion on WestlawNext, or if the resulting opinion did not refer to the diagram or referred to it with words other
than “sentence” and “diagram,” my research would have missed the diagram-containing brief. In sum, because no database
allows one to search for sentence diagrams in briefs directly, it is impossible to know how many diagram-containing briefs the
legal databases may harbor, let alone how many such briefs have not been picked up by the databases.
At any rate, while the number of diagram-containing briefs is no doubt small when compared to the sheer number of
briefs filed each week in fora across the country, these briefs do exist, and this article will examine what lessons, if any, we
may draw from them.
15 Because this article analyzes the use of sentence diagrams to illustrate only issues of statutory interpretation, it does not
discuss issues related to fact-finding and evidence that may arise with respect to diagrams illustrating issues of contract inter-
pretation. Sentence diagrams can be and have been used in briefs to illustrate contract-interpretation arguments. See, e.g.,
Brief for Appellant at 19, 23, Allison v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 964 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-3579) (diagramming
language in insurance policy). But the interpretation of a contract is normally an issue of fact, resolved through the presen-
tation of evidence to a factfinder, whether judge or jury. See Lawrence M. Solan, Can the Legal System Use Experts on
Meaning?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1999). Thus, the creation and use of a sentence diagram to prove a particular inter-
pretation of a contract potentially raises issues of evidence law: for example, whether a diagram is admissible as evidence, or
OLD HABITS 81
themselves are less compelling than attorneys may believe them to be, and
diagrams cannot elucidate all types of interpretive issues. Like an analogy,
a sentence diagram can illustrate an argument aptly—or ineptly—and
counsel’s ability to come up with an illustrative analogy or a diagram is no
guarantee that the illustrated argument has merit. 
This article first explains the nature of sentence diagrams and then
discusses their potential utility in briefs. It then describes two cases where
the inclusion of diagrams in briefs was less useful, or even counterpro-
ductive. In closing, it offers some concrete advice to attorneys on the use
of sentence diagrams in written legal advocacy. 
II. The Nature of Sentence Diagrams
A sentence diagram is simply an illustration of the grammatical rela-
tionship of the words, phrases, and clauses in a sentence.16 A very simple
way to display such relationships is through tabulation. Thus, for example,
in the sentence “Stephanie and Michelle bought coffee and donuts,” the
following tabulation scheme shows that “Stephanie” and “Michelle” have
similar roles (as subjects of the sentence), that “bought” has a differing role
(as the verb), and that “coffee” and “donuts” each have a third role (as
direct objects): 
In the United States, teachers have used more graphic means of
displaying these types of grammatical relationships to students since the
mid-nineteenth century.17 Building on the work of earlier educators,
whether a linguist who created a diagram and testifies about it may qualify as an expert witness. See id. at 1183–89
(discussing linguists as expert witnesses). In contrast, statutory interpretation is a purely legal inquiry, not a factual one. See
id. at 1170. Therefore, in briefs that make statutory-interpretation arguments, sentence diagrams would not normally be
considered evidence or raise evidentiary issues.
16 See STEVEN PINKER, THE SENSE OF STYLE 81–83 (2014) (demonstrating three different ways of displaying the gram-
matical relationships within a sentence, one using branching lines, one using braces and brackets, and one using Venn-style
ellipses).
17 See FLOREY, supra note 10, at 29–43 (describing the history of graphical sentence-diagramming, beginning in 1860); Juana
Summers, A Picture of Language: The Fading Art of Diagramming Sentences, NPR Ed (Aug. 22, 2014 5:25 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/08/22/341898975/a-picture-of-language-the-fading-art-of-diagramming-sentences.
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Alonzo Reed and Brainerd Kellogg in 1877 introduced a diagramming
method, built on a straight horizontal line, that “swept through American
public schools like the measles.”18 Their method, introduced in their
textbook Higher Lessons in English19 and refined by later teachers,20
instructs students to place a sentence’s subject, verb, and object along a
horizontal line, separated by shorter vertical lines.21 Thus, “Stephanie
bought coffee” is rendered as follows: 
Compound subjects or objects are represented thus: 
Modifying words and phrases are visually linked to the words they
modify through slanted lines: 
What has come to be known as the Reed-Kellogg method of sentence
diagramming also includes rules for representing prepositional phrases,
relative clauses, interjections, and just about every other aspect of tradi-
tional sentence grammar.22 Judge Gorsuch’s diagram in the Rentz opinion
18 FLOREY, supra note 10, at 13.
19 The manuscript of Higher Lessons was copyrighted by Reed and Kellogg in 1877, and the book was published in 1880 by
Clark and Maynard Publishers. An electronic copy of the original is accessible for free through the nonprofit Internet Archive
at https://archive.org/details/higherlessonsin09kellgoog . 
20 Professors Homer C. House and Susan Emolyn Harman expanded upon the diagramming method of Reed and Kellogg in
their own twentieth-century textbook, see HOMER C. HOUSE & SUSAN EMOLYN HARMON, DESCRIPTIVE ENGLISH
GRAMMAR vi (2d ed. 1950). According to Kitty Burns Florey, “their book was a best-seller.” FLOREY, supra note 10, at 57 n.10.
21 See FLOREY, supra note 10, at 52–56 (describing Reed-Kellogg diagrams). For comprehensive, contemporary instruction
in the Reed-Kellogg method, see EUGENE R. MOUTOUx, DIAGRAMMING STEP BY STEP: ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE
STEPS TO ExCELLENCE IN SENTENCE-DIAGRAMMING (2013).
22 See generally MOUTOUx, supra note 21. But see PINKER, supra note 16, at 88 (explaining that “modern grammarians have
sorted words into grammatical categories that sometimes differ from the traditional pigeonholes” and criticizing traditional
grammarians for failing to distinguish word categories, such as noun or verb, from word functions).
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follows the Reed-Kellogg method, and Kitty Burns Florey’s Sister
Bernadette’s Barking Dog offers numerous examples and explanations of
complex Reed-Kellogg diagrams,23 as do other sources.24 Indeed, although
the teaching of traditional diagramming has waned considerably since the
mid-twentieth century,25 one still can find textbooks,26 websites,27
YouTube videos,28 and even diagram-generating apps29 intended to help
people understand and create classic Reed-Kellogg sentence diagrams. 
Among academic linguists, various types of tree diagrams have
replaced Reed-Kellogg diagrams as a way to display the grammatical
design of a sentence.30 Tree diagrams have the virtue of displaying words
in the same left-to-right sequence as the original sentence, and these
diagrams can also include labels indicating both categories and functions
of words and phrases: 
23 See FLOREY, supra note 10, at 14–21, 82–110.
24 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Ruiz Frost, The Upside of Diagramming Sentences, 75 OR. ST. BAR BULL. 13 (June 2015)
(including and explaining six Reed-Kellogg diagrams); Writer’s Relief Staff, This Old Grammar Trick Still Works! How to
Diagram a Sentence, Huffington Post (Oct. 1, 2014 9:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/01/diagram-
sentence-grammar_n_5908462.html (including and explaining eight diagrams).
25 See FLOREY, supra note 10, at 137.
26 See, e.g., DEBORAH WHITE BROADWATER, DIAGRAMMING SENTENCES (2004); MARYE HEFTY ET AL., SENTENCE
DIAGRAMMING: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO LEARNING GRAMMAR THROUGH DIAGRAMMING (2007); MOUTOUx,
supra note 21; ELIzABETH O’BRIEN, SENTENCE DIAGRAMMING ExERCISES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SENTENCE
DIAGRAMMING (2012).
27 See, e.g., Grammar Revolution: Grammar the Easy Way, http://www.english-grammar-revolution.com (last visited Mar. 11,
2016).
28 See, e.g., Diagrammar, Sentence Diagramming Forms, (Aug. 29, 2010) www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqHPqdmljwM.
29 I found one website, sponsored by a mysterious entity called 1Aiway, offering a diagramming app for download, at
http://1aiway.com/. I make no representations as to 1Aiway or the quality of its software.
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Tree diagrams also reflect a more sophisticated and more empirically
tested understanding of English grammar.31
Nevertheless, when it comes to sentence-diagramming in legal
opinions and briefs, the Reed-Kellogg horizontal line still rules,32 probably
because the lawyers and judges most likely to consider the option of
including diagrams in the first place are those who became familiar with
traditional diagramming in grade school. My research did, however,
uncover a few briefs containing intuitive forms of diagrams that used tabu-
lation or combinations of arrows, boxes, or circles, indicating that the brief
writers either were unfamiliar with the Reed-Kellogg method or had
consciously abandoned it in favor of a more self-explanatory form. I have
yet to find a legal opinion or brief containing a tree diagram, likely because
most lawyers have not had occasion to learn the terminology and
diagramming style of modern academic linguists.
III. The Potential Power and Utility of Sentence
Diagrams in Briefs
A. The Power of Diagrams and the New Receptivity to Images in
Litigation Documents
When it comes to explaining ideas, words and images are often more
effective than words alone.33 One theory posits that learners build a verbal
mental model of a concept from text and a pictorial mental model of the
30 MOUTOUx, supra note 21, at 215; FLOREY, supra note 10, at 137–38. Steven Pinker, for example, has called Reed-Kellogg
notation “just one way to display syntax on a page, and not a particularly good one, with user-unfriendly features such as
scrambled word order and arbitrary graphical conventions.” PINKER, supra note 16, at 78. Gene Moutoux has included a
substantial section on tree-diagramming in his sentence-diagramming textbook and notes that “[n]o matter how convinced
you are of the merits of Reed & Kellogg diagramming, I think you will agree with me that we can learn much from modern
linguists’ syntactical analyses and from their presentation of these analyses in tree diagrams.” MOUTOUx, supra note 21, at
215. For a particularly lucid explanation of one type of tree diagram, see PINKER, supra note 16, at 81–89.
31 As Steven Pinker explains, 
[I]t’s essential to keep an open mind about how to diagram a sentence rather than assuming that everything you need
to know about grammar was figured out before you were born. Categories, functions, and meanings have to be ascer-
tained empirically, by running little experiments such as substituting a phrase whose category you don’t know for one
you do know and seeing whether the sentence still works. Based on these mini-experiments, modern grammarians
have sorted words into grammatical categories that sometimes differ from the traditional pigeonholes.
PINKER, supra note 16, at 88. 
32 Please pardon the pun.
33 See RICHARD E. MAYER, MULTIMEDIA LEARNING 232–36 (2d ed. 2009) (summarizing multiple empirical studies, all of
which indicate that “adding pictures to words resulted in improvements in students’ understanding of the explanation”);
Kirsten R. Butcher, The Multimedia Principle, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF MULTIMEDIA LEARNING 174, 175
(Richard E. Mayer ed., 2d ed. 2014) (citing studies and noting that “there is consistent evidence that learners in general (not
individuals with a specific learning style) are better supported by combinations of visual and verbal information than by text
alone”). But see Wolfgang Schnotz, Integrated Model of Text and Picture Comprehension (describing studies indicating that
learners with high prior knowledge may not benefit, and may even learn less, when pictures are added to text because the
pictures are redundant for these learners, who lose time and mental effort in processing this redundant information), in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF MULTIMEDIA LEARNING, supra, at 72, 88–89.
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same concept from an accompanying image and then hold both models in
working memory while building connections between the two; this
building of connections is believed to be “an important step in conceptual
understanding.”34 Another theory holds that learners build a single mental
model from a passage of text and an accompanying image by relying
initially and primarily on the text and then using the image as “some scaf-
folding of the initial mental model.”35 In either case, the research literature
supports the idea that adding images, including diagrams, to text can
significantly enhance learning,36 especially when the images appear imme-
diately before the relevant text,37 the images are appropriately and not
overly detailed,38 and the learner has enough background knowledge of
the concept to follow the complexity of the images.39
Despite this research, the legal profession has been historically wary
with respect to the inclusion of images—whether diagrams, photographs,
or other illustrations—in written briefs and opinions.40 Nevertheless, we
appear to be at the start of a belated visual revolution in written legal
advocacy and adjudication. In 2014, scholar Elizabeth Porter noted “a
broad shift toward the visual in our conception and practice of written
law.”41 Citing, among other developments, the rise of electronic court-
filing, the ease with which images may now be inserted into electronic
documents, and the increasing tendency of judges to read briefs on tablets
and other computer screens, Porter declared that “[i]mage-driven written
persuasion is here.”42
Porter has not been alone in calling attention to the persuasive
potential of images in written legal advocacy. A 2012 article by an expe-
rienced practitioner advised that “[w]ell-crafted images—charts,
diagrams, photographs—can make . . . briefs more interesting and
persuasive.”43 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has called for
34 MAYER, supra note 33, at 229 (explaining “the cognitive
theory of multimedia learning”).
35 See Schnotz, supra note 33, at 93 (explaining the author’s
integrative model of text-and-picture comprehension, or
“ITCP”).
36 Butcher, supra note 33, at 175.
37 See Schnotz, supra note 33, at 91–92 (noting that “if the
picture is presented after the text, the picture will most
likely interfere with the previously text-based constructed
mental model” and that “[s]uch interference is avoided when
the picture is presented before the text even if the learner
looks only briefly at the picture to benefit from its mental
model scaffolding function”).
38 See Butcher, supra note 33, at 182.
39 See id. (describing a study indicating that learners with
low prior knowledge benefitted from the addition of simple,
but not complex, diagrams to text, while learners with high
prior knowledge learned equally well from additions of
simple diagrams and complex diagrams).
40Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 1687, 1698 (2014) (noting “law’s historical and
current resistance to visual communication”). See also id. at
1699–717 (explaining why legal writing has remained rela-
tively free of images, despite technological developments).
41 Id. at 1723.
42 See id. at 1721–23.
43 Adam L. Rosman, Visualizing the Law: Using Charts,
Diagrams, and Other Images to Improve Legal Briefs, 63 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 70, 70 (2013).
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increased use of images in briefs,44 and Chief Judge Theodore McKee of
the Third Circuit has noted that “attorneys could make use of analytical
visuals” in their filings with his court.45 Scholars and teachers of legal
writing have similarly begun to promote the use of digital imagery in
briefs.46
Ironically, this very new openness to digital imagery in brief writing,
coupled with recent technological developments, may reinvigorate Sister
Bernadette’s nearly lost art, at least among lawyers and judges. Sentence
diagrams of all types are easier than ever to create, whether with the
drawing tools built into Microsoft Word or with new, specialized
software.47 Further, to the extent that judges may occasionally use a
sentence diagram in an opinion, those diagrams are now more visible to
researchers. For example, one can now view Judge Gorsuch’s sentence
diagram in Rentz simply by pulling up the case on WestlawNext, without
having to print or download the opinion. Both Westlaw and Lexis now
display images as parts of judicial opinions, at least some of the time.48
Once lawyers can see that judges are occasionally using diagrams as
“analytical” visual imagery, to “walk[ ] the reader through some aspect of
legal reasoning,”49 those lawyers can also see the utility of offering
diagrams up to the court in the first place, in their briefs. 
44 Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts—One Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 12
(2013).
45 See Steve Johansen & Ruth Anne Robbins, Art-iculating the Analysis: Systemizing the Decision to Use Visuals As Legal
Reasoning, 20 LEGAL WRITING: THE JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE 57, 61 n.11 (2015) (paraphrasing
telephone interview of Judge McKee by Professor Robbins).
46 See, e.g., id. at 60 (noting that attorneys who have begun to incorporate analytical visual imagery into their briefs “are
advancing legal writing in a positive direction, and other lawyers should follow suit”); Ellie Margolis, Is the Medium the
Message? Unleashing the Power of E-Communication in the Twenty-First Century, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1,
25 (2015) (“If legal writing does not change to incorporate images, it will become increasingly out of step with readers’ expec-
tations of digital documents.”).
47 The drawing tools in Microsoft Word, for example, allow for the creation of solid or dotted lines at various angles with the
insertion of text boxes, making it possible to draw Reed-Kellogg diagrams, tree diagrams, and other types of line- or shape-
based diagrams of the creator’s choosing. In addition, specialized software such as Toolbox for Writers Sentence Diagrammer
Plus, see http://toolboxforwriters.com/software-products/sentence-diagramming-software/, and the University of Central
Florida’s SenDraw, see http://sendraw.ucf.edu/, are designed specifically for the creation of Reed-Kellogg diagrams.
48 This information is based on a report from Reference Librarian Rebekah Maxwell of the Coleman Karesh Law Library at
the University of South Carolina School of Law. Ms. Maxwell spoke with customer-service representatives from both
Westlaw and Lexis on July 27, 2015. See email from Rebekah Maxwell, Assoc. Dir., Coleman Karesh Law Library, to Lisa
Eichhorn, Professor, Univ. of S.C. School of Law (July 27, 2015, 12:38 p.m. EST) (on file with author). The increasing display
by Westlaw and Lexis of images in judicial opinions begins to remedy, belatedly, a problem raised in 1997 by Hampton
Dellinger regarding the Supreme Court’s use of photos and other graphics: “By using more than words, the Court denies to
some readers, both now and in the future, access to some parts of certain opinions.” Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use
of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704, 1709 (1997).
49 See Johansen & Robbins, supra note 45, at 64.
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B. Some Specific Examples of Persuasive Sentence Diagrams in
Statutory-Interpretation Cases
Statutory-interpretation issues can cry out for illustration through
sentence diagramming. A former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court has explained that members of her court “often” created their own
sentence diagrams to help themselves interpret statutory language.50
Scholar Lawrence Solan found himself using a tree diagram to help explain
his critique of the California Court of Appeals’ interpretation of a statute.51
In his Rentz opinion, Judge Gorsuch’s sentence diagram neatly encap-
sulates a preceding 96-word-long, less-than-riveting verbal explanation of
the structure of the statutory sentence whose interpretation was at issue.52
A close examination of Rentz and of another recent case,53 in which
the Department of Justice filed a brief containing a sentence diagram,
reveals the unique way in which sentence diagrams can persuade with
respect to specific statutory-interpretation issues.
1. Rentz
Rentz offers a good example of an interpretive issue that could have
lent itself to a persuasive sentence diagram at the briefing stage. Again, at
issue was whether a defendant who fired only a single shot from a
firearm—which caused both an assault and a murder—could receive two
separate charges under a statute covering “any person who, during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or
carries a firearm.”54 Another way of stating this issue is whether the
statute’s “unit of prosecution” is using a firearm—which Mr. Rentz did
once—or committing a violent or drug-trafficking crime by use of a
firearm—which Mr. Rentz did twice.55
For convenience, Judge Gorsuch’s diagram56 is repeated on the facing
page. 
50 Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme Court, 8 TEx. REV. OF L. & POL.
261, 266 (2004).
51 See SOLAN, supra note 13, at 34–36 (critiquing Bd. of Trustees v. Judge, 123 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1975)).
52 That textual explanation reads as follows:
[T]he statute prohibits using or carrying a gun during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,
or possessing a gun in furtherance of any such crime. These adverbial prepositional phrases modify the verbs uses,
carries, and possesses. See The Chicago Manual of Style, supra, §§ 5.143, 5.166; Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern
American Usage 879, 911 (3d ed. 2009). They tell us which acts of using, carrying, or possessing Congress sought to
punish—explaining that the statute doesn’t seek to make illegal all such acts, only the narrower subset the phrases
specify.
United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
53 United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
54 Rentz, 777 F.3d at 1106 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
55 Id. at 1107.
56 Id. at 1110.
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The diagram emphasizes the primacy of the verb “uses” by placing it
on a Reed-Kellogg horizontal line with its subject and direct object: “who
uses a firearm.” This aspect of the diagram also recalls the opinion’s
preceding point that “[w]hen seeking a statute’s unit of prosecution . . . the
feature that naturally draws our immediate attention is the statute’s verb.”57
The diagram also subordinates the idea of the other crimes committed
during the firearm’s use by placing the phrase “during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime” on a slanting line running
downward from the verb “uses.” 
Thus, according to the opinion, and as illustrated by the diagram, the
statute’s unit of prosecution is “using” the firearm, and the reference to
other crimes simply limits the kind of using that can lead to a charge of
violating the statute. Indeed, the words immediately following the diagram
in the opinion are “Visualized this way, it’s hard to see how the total
number of charges might ever exceed the number of uses.”58 Imagine the
persuasive force this same diagram could have had in the defendant’s brief.
What purpose has a brief, if not to make it “hard to see” how an
opponent’s position is more meritorious than one’s own?
The diagram’s visual power even infuses the majority’s description of
the government’s opposing argument, which the court rejected in visual
terms:
Under the government’s reading, an act of using . . . is part of the
government’s burden for the first conviction. The statute’s verb counts
then. But the government would have us ignore that requirement for any
additional charges. In later charges our focus would be limited
myopically to the sentence’s adverbial phrases without even a stolen
glance at the verb[] those phrases modify. A sort of appearing and then
57 Id. at 1109. 58 Rentz, 777 F.3d at 1110 (emphasis added). 
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disappearing elemental burden, a world in which verbs vanish but their
modifiers float freely and commandingly alone.59
One look at the sentence diagram shows the reader that modifiers
cannot float freely alone; they are part of an integrated Reed-Kellogg road
system and, in this case, veer gently off the verb “uses” at forty-five
degrees.
Of course, the diagram does not definitively settle the legal issue in
Rentz. Even Judge Gorsuch’s opinion allows that “in the business of
statutory interpretation, we do not always bow to linguistic rules,”60 and
the court offers several additional justifications for its ultimate holding.61
Nevertheless, the diagram has a uniquely persuasive force that differs
qualitatively from the force of the other, purely verbal, explanations in the
opinion. It would have had the same force in a brief filed to the court.
Why does the diagram work well in the Rentz opinion, and why would
it work so well in a brief? Much of the answer lies in the nature of the
statutory-interpretation issue before the court. The issue did not concern
the scope of a single statutory word,62 but rather the meaning to be
derived from the relationship between two parts of the sentence: “uses”
and “during or in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime.” And the purpose of sentence diagrams is to display such rela-
tionships within a sentence. 
The one dissenter in Rentz argued that the statute’s unit of prose-
cution was not the using of a firearm but “the combination of the conduct
identified in [the statute].”63 He explained that the case involved two
separate “combination crimes”: “(1) second-degree murder (crime of
violence) facilitated by a gun and (2) assault causing serious bodily injury
(crime of violence) also facilitated by a gun.”64
In making this argument, the government could have included in its
brief a different type of diagram, displaying only the part of the statutory
sentence at issue and showing the “any crime of violence” language
working in combination with the verb “uses”—perhaps something like
this: 
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Because the arguments on either side concern the meaning to be
made from synthesizing the parts of the sentence, they lend themselves
naturally to illustration through diagram, in addition to explanation
through text. A sentence diagram has utility in a brief not because it
represents the only way to synthesize the parts of a statutory sentence or
because it replaces (what is often somewhat tedious) textual explanation of
the synthesis, but because it can persuasively and interestingly sum up a
point made in textual argument.
2. Catalan
A 2012 Department of Justice brief65 filed in a Ninth Circuit case,
United States v. Catalan,66 contains an old-school Reed-Kellogg diagram
that effectively illustrates the point of the government’s argument
regarding the interpretation of a Sentencing Guideline. While the
argument did not win the day,67 the diagram communicates the
government’s interpretation of the Guideline’s language in a way the prose
in the brief cannot.
The defendant in the case, Moises Vasquez Catalan, was convicted in
California of drug trafficking and sentenced to a 180-day jail term to be
followed by probation for 36 months.68 Upon completing his jail time, he
was deported to Mexico and subsequently entered the United States
illegally.69 While still on probation for his drug offense, Mr. Catalan was
convicted in California again, this time of giving a false name to police.70
While he served a 60-day jail sentence for this second offense, the state
court rescinded his probation and replaced it with an additional 360-day
jail sentence for his earlier drug crime.71 After serving this sentence, Mr.
Catalan was released into federal custody and pleaded guilty to the federal
crime of illegally re-entering the United States.72
Thus, before his deportation, Mr. Catalan had received a sentence for
a drug offense of about six months in jail plus probation. But after his
59 Id. at 1111 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 1109.
61 See id. at 1108–14 (discussing the broader context of the
statute, its legislative history and apparent underlying
policies, and the rule of lenity).
62 As scholar Lawrence Solan explains, “most legal battles
over language are battles over the meanings of words: Did
the defendant’s state of mind constitute ‘scienter’? Is an
arson ring an ‘enterprise’ as defined by RICO, the racket-
eering statute? Does a college’s promise to use a donation for
certain purposes constitute ‘consideration’?” SOLAN, supra
note 13, at 139.
63 777 F.3d at 1131 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
65Government’s Answering Brief, United States v. Catalan,
701 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-50318).
66 701 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
67 See id. at 333.
68 Id. at 332.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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deportation, the sentence for that drug offense increased by almost twelve
months to a total of almost eighteen months: 
A federal Sentencing Guideline applied to his conviction for illegal re-
entry. A part of that Guideline would add a certain enhancement to his
sentence for that crime if 
the defendant previously was deported . . . after . . . a conviction for a
felony that is . . . a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence
imposed exceeded 13 months.73
Mr. Catalan appealed the application of this enhancement to him,
arguing that the “grouping” of certain words together in the above
Guideline text meant that the enhancement would apply only if a
defendant had been both convicted of a drug-trafficking felony and
actually sentenced to a term exceeding thirteen months before he was
deported.74
In responding to this word-grouping argument, the government’s
brief, in about forty lines of text, emphasized that the only operative words
that were grouped together in the Guideline were “previously deported”
and “after a conviction.”75 The language regarding the length of the
“sentence” for that conviction was far away from the reference to depor-
tation, suggesting that later additions to the sentence should count in the
“exceeds 13 months” calculation, regardless of the relative timing of the
sentence additions and the deportation.76
In addition, to illustrate the distance between the “previously
deported” language and the “sentence imposed exceeded 13 months”
73 Id. at 332 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
74 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15–16, United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-50318).
75 Government’s Answering Brief at 18–20, United States v. Catalan, 701 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-50318).
76 Id. at 19–20.
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language, the brief included the following Reed-Kellogg sentence
diagram:77
This diagram emphasizes the distance between the deportation
concept and the duration-of-sentence concept in a way that the brief ’s
textual explanation cannot. It also gives the appearance of being much
more concrete and precise than the vague reference to word-grouping in
the opposing brief. The diagram thus bolstered the government’s
argument that the Guideline was, at best, ambiguous as to whether the
time added to Mr. Catalan’s drug-trafficking sentence should count in the
determination of whether the sentence “exceeded thirteen months.” And
even if the Guideline itself was ambiguous, the government argued, an
Application Note to the Guideline indicated that the added time should
count toward the thirteen-month requirement.78
In the end, the United States Sentencing Commission itself
recognized the need to clarify how the Guideline was intended to apply in
a case like Mr. Catalan’s. The Commission amended the Guideline—after
the briefs were filed but before the Ninth Circuit decided Mr. Catalan’s
case—to clarify that post-deportation additions to a defendant’s sentence
should not count in the “exceeds 13 months” calculation.79 Applying this
amendment, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Catalan’s sentence for illegal
entry had been excessively enhanced, and the court remanded his case for
77 See id. at 20. The original diagram in the brief displayed the words “was previously deported” in green, the words “for
which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months” in red, and the remaining words in black. This scheme emphasized the
distance between the two colored phrases. Because this journal is printed only in black and white, I have used uppercase
rather than red and black for those two phrases in an attempt to produce a similar visual effect.
78 See id. at 20 (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) [app. n.1(B)(vii))].
79 See 701 F.3d at 333.
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resentencing.80 However, the fact that the government’s argument did not
prevail does not detract from the effectiveness of the sentence diagram in
conveying that argument clearly and forcefully. Because the argument
concerned the contested relation of the parts of a complicated textual
sentence, the diagram could enhance the mere “word authority”81 of the
brief ’s verbal explanation.
IV. The Limits and Misuses of Sentence Diagrams 
in Briefs
A. The Limitations of Diagrams in Statutory-Interpretation
Arguments
Of course, statutory interpretation involves more than grammatical
parsing of sentences. In the absence of controlling precedent, courts
routinely look to a statute’s broader context for clues to the meaning of an
individual provision.82 A statute’s evolution through amendments may
provide additional insights.83 And, depending on a court’s philosophy, it
may consider evidence of legislative intent and the general purpose of the
statutory scheme.84 Various substantive canons, such as the rule of lenity
in criminal cases, may also factor into a court’s interpretive process.85
Further, the majority of statutory-interpretation cases involve the
scope of a single statutory word or phrase, rather than the syntactic
relations of various parts of a statutory sentence.86 Only in the latter
category of cases—those involving syntactical ambiguity—are sentence
diagrams potentially useful. And even then, when the parties are fighting,
for example, over whether the phrase “involving moral turpitude” modifies
both “felony” and “any crime” in the phrase “conviction of a felony or of
any crime involving moral turpitude,” a diagram cannot resolve the
syntactic ambiguity; it can only illustrate one possible interpretation.87
80 Id.
81 See EDWARD R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION 191 (2d ed. 2001) (“[W]ord authority
can dominate our vision, and we may come to see only through the lenses of word authority rather than with our own eyes.“).
82 See, e.g., United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . .”).
83 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 276–77 (2d ed. 2006).
84 Id. at 249–51 (discussing “how statutory interpretation has customarily been done in this century by the U.S. Supreme
Court”).
85 See id. at 360–82 (discussing three substantive canons, including the rule of lenity). See also SOLAN, supra note 13, at 66
(arguing that courts apply substantive canons “in a manner that leads the careful observer to develop serious questions about
the predictability, and perhaps even the sincerity, of their application in particular cases”).
86 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 40 (2010) (noting that “battles over statutory meaning are
nearly always about the ‘wordlike’ aspects of the statute’s language rather than the syntactic, rulelike aspects of the statute”).
87 See SOLAN, supra note 13, at 34–36. 
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Nevertheless, lawyers risk over-investing in the power of sentence
diagrams, and of grammar in general, to settle statutory-interpretation
issues. Our childhood exposure to a language allows us to develop a
“generative grammar” that “specifies in detail how to put together well-
formed sentences, and tells us a good deal about how they may and may
not be interpreted.”88 This generative grammar allows all English speakers
to agree that the sentence “James saw a cat” means that James did the
seeing and the cat was seen. As lawyers, we want our legal arguments to be
met with the same kind of automatic agreement, so in legal briefs a resort
to grammar, and to diagrammatic illustrations of grammar, is very
tempting.89
But neither our generative grammar nor the rules of English grammar
can eliminate all semantic ambiguity.90 For example, neither tells us
whether in the sentence “He saw a man and a woman with a child,” the
child was with both adults or only with the woman. An accurate diagram
would show us that “He” is the subject, “saw” the verb, and “a man and a
woman” the direct object, but that’s where the grammatical certainty ends
and the possibility of differing diagrams begins. And if the diagrammer,
like many these days, lacks some basic grammatical knowledge,91 we may
not even get that far. But like the viewer who may naively assume that a
photograph accurately represents a single truth,92 an attorney viewing his
or her own sentence diagram can easily overestimate its applicability to
the real issue before the court, or its persuasive force, or both. These
problems are evident in the two briefs filed in the federal appellate cases
analyzed below.
88 See id. at 21 (referring to Noam Chomsky’s concept of generative grammar).
89 Lawrence Solan similarly observes that various pressures can cause a court to cite “neutral linguistic principles as justifi-
cation for a decision” when the “real reasons” for the decision lie elsewhere. Id. at 27. 
90 Id. at 21.
91 See Aïda M. Alaka, The Grammar Wars Come to Law School, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343, 345–51 (2010) (describing a general
decline in the teaching of formal grammar in K–12 beginning in the 1980s and noting a lack of knowledge of grammar and
punctuation rules among law students); Catherine H. Finn & Claudia Diamond, Are We Listening?: Here’s How the Profession
Can Advocate for Reforms in Legal Writing Education, WASH. LAW. (Jan. 2015), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publi-
cations/washington-lawyer/articles/january-2015-taking-the-stand.cfm (reporting that attorneys and judges in the
Baltimore–Washington region responded to a survey by ranking “grammar/usage” as the problem seen most often in recent
law graduates’ written work and by commenting frequently that “students are not graduating law school with satisfactory
grammar and syntax skills”).
92 See Porter, supra note 40, at 1756 (defining “naïve realism” as “the tendency to believe that images are transparent
conveyors of a single truth”).
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B. Examples of Problematic Uses of Sentence Diagrams in Briefs
1. Kehoe
The root of the dispute in kehoe v. Fidelity Bank & Trust93 was a
poorly drafted statute. Specifically, a provision of the federal Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) grants a motorist a cause of action against
people who obtain, disclose, or use the motorist’s personal information
from motor vehicle records for unpermitted purposes.94 The DPPA’s
remedies provision lists four specific types of relief the court may award,
including punitive damages and attorney’s fees; the first of the four listed
items is “(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the
amount of $2,500.”95
Of course, actual damages and liquidated damages are two different
and mutually exclusive types of damages; actual damages cannot logically
be described as liquidated damages above or below any amount.96
Therefore, the literal wording of the provision does not make sense.
Presumably, Congress intended to allow a court to award liquidated
damages of $2500, or actual damages, whichever is greater.
James Kehoe filed a class-action complaint seeking relief under the
DPPA against Fidelity Bank, which had purchased over half a million
records from the Florida DMV and used Kehoe’s and other motorists’
addresses to solicit them via a mass mailing.97 The relief Kehoe sought
included liquidated damages “in the amount of $2,500.00 for each instance
in which [Fidelity] obtained or used personal information concerning
[Kehoe] and members of the Class.”98 Fidelity admitted that it had
obtained and used the motorists’ personal information for purposes not
permitted by the DPPA,99 but, on summary judgment, Kehoe failed to
produce any evidence of actual damage resulting from Fidelity’s
conduct.100
After the district court granted summary judgment against Kehoe on
the ground that he had failed to show any actual damages, Kehoe appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that a plaintiff need not prove actual
damages before he or she may recover liquidated damages under the
DPPA.101
Fidelity, of course, argued on appeal that proof of actual damages is a
prerequisite to an award of liquidated damages under the DPPA, and its
93 421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2005).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a), quoted in kehoe v. Fidelity Bank &
Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
95 Id. § 2724(b), quoted in kehoe, 421 F.3d at 1213.
96 See kehoe, 421 F.3d at 1213 (discussing the difference
between actual damages and liquidated damages).
97 Id. at 1210–11.
98 Id. at 1211 (quoting complaint) (brackets in kehoe).
99 Id. at 1212.
100 Id. at 1211.
101 Id.
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brief attempted to parse the unfortunately drafted provision allowing
courts to award “actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in
the amount of $2,500.”102 In doing so, it presented two opposing sentence
diagrams in its brief, one representing Fidelity’s proposed interpretation of
the statutory language (labeled “Statutory Language of DPPA”), and the
other representing Kehoe’s interpretation (labeled “Plaintiff ’s
Interpretation of DPPA”103):
The use of these sentence diagrams—or any sentence diagram— to
support Fidelity’s argument was fundamentally flawed. As explained
above, no solid or dotted line in a diagram can make the phrase “not less
than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500” logically modify “actual
damages,” given that actual damages and liquidated damages are mutually
exclusive. Tellingly, the brief introduces the diagrams with the mistaken
notion that “[f ]or generations, school aged children learned to diagram
sentences to determine the sentence’s [sic] meaning.”104 In fact, no
diagram can reveal meaning to the diagrammer; at best, it’s the other way
around: “One diagrams according to one’s understanding of the sentence.
. . . Meaning does not spring magically from a diagram.”105
102 Brief of Appellee at 14, kehoe v. Fidelity Bank & Trust,
421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-13306).
103 Id. at 15.
104 Id.
105 See FLOREY, supra note 10, at 141 (quoting author Gene
Moutoux).
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Further, even a diagram based on a thorough understanding of a
sentence’s grammar will not reveal the semantic meaning of a sentence.
Noam Chomsky’s famous example of a grammatically clear but seman-
tically impenetrable sentence—“Colorless green ideas sleep furiously”—is
perfectly diagrammable, but no diagram will reveal its definitive
meaning.106 In kehoe, the issue on appeal did not concern the grammatical
relation of the phrase “actual damages” to the phrase “but not less than
liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500” but instead concerned the
phrases’ intended semantic relation, given that the literal language as
drafted simply did not make sense. 
The textual explanation of the diagrams in Fidelity’s brief sent the
credibility of its argument sliding a bit further: “The dependent clause
(‘liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500’) modifies the independent
clause (‘The Court may award actual damages’). As a grammatical matter
(and a matter of logic), the recovery of liquidated damages is thus
dependent upon a demonstration of actual damages.”107 In fact, as a matter
of grammar, “liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500” is not a clause
because a clause requires both a subject and verb. The brief also
mistakenly labeled the word “but” as a “subordinating” conjunction, in an
apparent attempt to subordinate or downplay the “but not less than
liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500” language. Unfortunately for
Fidelity, “but” is not a subordinating conjunction, and, as a matter of legal
doctrine, liquidated damages awards do not depend on proof of actual
damages but instead allow for relief when actual damages are unmea-
surable or uncertain.108
Thus, in the end, Fidelity’s brief used a diagram to do work that a
diagram simply cannot do and revealed a misunderstanding of some
technical grammatical principles in the process. Not surprisingly, the
Eleventh Circuit noted the logical problem inherent in the “actual
damages, but not less than liquidated damages” language and focused on
Congress’ apparently intended meaning rather than on the grammatical
relationships of the statutory words and phrases:
Since liquidated damages are an appropriate substitute for the potentially
uncertain and unmeasurable actual damages of a privacy violation, it
follows that proof of actual damages is not necessary for an award of
106 See STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 79 (2007) (noting that
“[s]entences can make no sense but can still be recognized as grammatical” and that “syntax and sense can be independent of
each other”).
107 Brief of Appellee at 17, kehoe v. Fidelity Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-13306).
108 See kehoe, 421 F.3d at 1213.
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liquidated damages. To us, the plain meaning of the statute is clear—a
plaintiff need not prove actual damages to be awarded liquidated
damages.109
Thus, the court found the statutory language “plain” after identifying
the only logical way that the concept of actual damages could mesh with
the concept of liquidated damages in this provision, despite the provision’s
literal wording and Fidelity’s parsing of that literal wording.
2.Waco
The interpretive issue in Waco International, Inc. v. kHk Scaffolding
Houston, Inc.110 concerned the scope of a single statutory word, rather
than the relations of parts of a statutory sentence. As a result, an extensive
tabulation-style sentence diagram in KHK’s brief to the Fifth Circuit111
added nothing to its (prevailing) argument about the word at issue, and a
clearer and shorter diagram in Waco’s brief112 failed to persuade the court
to interpret the key word as Waco urged.
The case turned on Waco’s assertions that KHK had sold scaffolds by
misrepresenting them as having been manufactured by Waco.113 After
filing suit for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act, Waco obtained ex parte a seizure order under the Act and
seized scaffolds and business records from KHK.114 KHK was able to get
the seizure order dissolved after post-seizure hearings on the ground that
the scaffolds did not carry any counterfeit mark.115 It then asserted a coun-
terclaim for wrongful seizure in Waco’s lawsuit.116
A jury eventually found that KHK had neither infringed Waco’s
trademark nor competed unfairly and that Waco had wrongfully seized
KHK’s goods and records in bad faith.117 It awarded KHK over $730,000 in
attorney fees, $185,000 in costs, and $250,000 in punitive damages, but it
found that KHK had suffered no lost profits and no loss of goodwill from
the seizure.118
On appeal, Waco argued that the Lanham Act, which defines the
cause of action for wrongful seizure, does not permit a litigant to recover
attorney fees or punitive damages for wrongful seizure unless the litigant
109 See id.
110 278 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2002).
111 Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 49–50, Waco
Int’l, Inc. v. kHk Scaffolding Houston, Inc., 278 F.3d 523 (5th
Cir. 2002) (No. 00-20741) [hereinafter KHK Brief ].
112 Brief of Cross-Appellee and Reply Brief of Appellant at
28, Waco Int’l v. kHk Scaffolding Houston, 278 F.3d 523 (5th
Cir. 2002) (No. 00-20741) [hereinafter Waco Brief ]. 
113 Waco, 278 F.3d at 526–27.
114 Id. at 527.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 528.
118 Id.
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has proved actual damages such as lost profits or loss of goodwill.119
Waco’s argument turned on the following language in the Lanham Act:
A person who suffers damages by reason of a wrongful seizure under this
subsection has a cause of action against the applicant for the order under
which such seizure was made, and shall be entitled to recover such relief
as may be appropriate, including damages for lost profits, cost of
materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in instances where the
seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances, to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.120
More specifically, Waco argued that before being eligible for any of
the relief described above, a claimant first had to prove that he or she was
a “person who suffers damages by reason of a wrongful seizure,” and that
KHK had failed to do so because it had shown no actual damage resulting
from the seizure of its scaffolds and records.121
KHK countered this argument by pointing out that even a business
that suffers no lost profits or loss of goodwill from a seizure must still pay
attorneys to get the seizure dissolved and that this expense constitutes
“damages” suffered because of the seizure.122 In other words, it argued that
the word “damages” in the phrase “person who suffers damages by reason
of a wrongful seizure” could include fees paid to attorneys who manage to
get a wrongful seizure order dissolved in post-seizure hearings.123
The Fifth Circuit agreed with this argument, quoting McCarthy on
Trademarks, which explained that “‘a reasonable attorney fee’” was an
“element[] of actual damage” that could result from a wrongful seizure.124
It thus upheld the award of attorney fees, punitive damages, and costs that
the jury had awarded to KHK.125
What the Fifth Circuit did not cite, and surely did not benefit from,
was a lengthy, confusing, tabulation-style diagram in KHK’s brief of the
entire statutory sentence describing the wrongful-seizure cause of action
and remedies: 
119 See Waco Brief at 27–29.
120 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11).
121 See Waco Brief at 27–29.
122 See KHK Brief at 53.
123 Id. at 47 (explaining that the victim of a brief wrongful seizure may incur only attorney fees and related costs as losses
resulting from the seizure, but that “[t]he plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history indicate that the victim of a
wrongful seizure should be fully compensated” and that “[t]his compensation includes attorneys’ fees as damages arising out
of a wrongful seizure”).
124 Waco, 278 F.3d at 535 (quoting MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 30:44).
125 Id. at 536–37.
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Compounding the confusing nature of the diagram is the lack of any
real explanation, in the text following the diagram, of how exactly it
supports KHK’s argument. Instead, only a single, conclusory sentence
follows the diagram in the subsection of the brief in which the diagram
appears: “Therefore, distilled to its essence, the legislation provides that in
126 KHK Brief at 49–50.
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The subject: A person
Adjective modifier: who suffers damages
“Damage” modified by: by a wrongful seizure
Seizure modified by: under the subsection
The verb: has
The object: a cause of action
The object modified by the prepositional phrase: against the applicant
“Applicant” modified by: for the order
“Order” modified by: under which the seizure is made and
(joins the compound/complex sentence)
The subject: A person (with the above adjectival modifiers)
The verb: shall be entitled to recover
The object: such relief
“Relief” modified by: as may be appropriate
Which is modified by: including damages
Modified by the prepositional phrase: for
lost profits
cost of materials
loss of goodwill
and punitive damages
Which is modified by the prepositional phrase: in
Instances where the seizure was sought in bad faith
and (joining the second part of the compound/complex
sentence)
The verb: to recover
The object: attorney’s fee
Modified by the adjective: reasonable
Qualified by the conjunctive phrase: unless
The subject: the court
The verb: finds
The object: circumstances
Modified by the adjective: extenuating.126
the context of a wrongful seizure, a person shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney’s fee as damages unless the district court finds exten-
uating circumstances.”127 Indeed, the diagram does not even support the
conclusion stated in the sentence; nowhere does the text of the
diagrammed sentence or the diagram itself label attorney’s fees as
“damages.” KHK’s misplaced confidence in the explanatory power of its
diagram is also evident in the subheading of this part of its brief: “2. It’s a
Matter of Grammar: Diagraming the Sentence.”128
An even more significant problem with the sentence diagram is that
the nature of the issue being argued concerns only the scope of a single
statutory word—“damages,” in the phrase “A person who suffers
damages”—making the diagram entirely unnecessary. In the two sentences
preceding the diagram, KHK addresses the real issue, explaining that
Waco interprets the phrase “A person who suffers damages by reason of a
wrongful seizure” to mean a person who suffers actual damages (such as
lost profits) from a seizure, but that the statutory language instead refers
simply to suffering “damages” and not “actual damages.”129 At that point in
KHK’s brief, it does not require a two-page tabulated diagram of the
statutory sentence to show that the word “actual” does not appear between
“suffers” and “damages.” 
A tabulated sentence diagram in Waco’s brief strips out much of the
uncontested statutory language, but, for the same reason, is no more illu-
minating of the single-word interpretive issue presented to the court: 
Again, because the only issue for the court concerned whether having
to pay a lawyer to get a wrongful seizure dissolved constituted “damages”
suffered by reason of a wrongful seizure, the structure of the rest of the
sentence is irrelevant. Waco’s diagram may demonstrate an accurate
127 Id. at 51.
128 Id. at 48.
129 See id.
130 Waco Brief at 28.
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A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure
is entitled to recover relief . . . including damages for lost profits, cost of
materials, loss of good will . . .
and
[is entitled] to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.130
understanding of overall syntax of the sentence, but it gives the court no
insight into why someone who has paid an attorney to get a seizure
dissolved has not suffered “damage” from the seizure.131
V. Specific Advice Regarding the Use 
of Sentence Diagrams in Briefs 
As noted above,132 a resort to grammar, and to sentence diagramming,
may be a very tempting argumentative tack when statutory interpretation
is at issue, but brief writers need to keep certain caveats in mind. 
First, as both kehoe and Waco illustrate, unless the court must
determine how the various grammatical components of a statutory
sentence relate to each other, a sentence diagram has no persuasive utility.
And even when syntax is at issue, attorneys should consider whether a
diagram will add anything of value to a textual explanation of the
argument. If the brief can explain the grammatical point in two or three
clear sentences, then a diagram may serve only to distract the reader from
the logic of the brief ’s text.133 At their best, diagrams should clarify
unavoidably complex textual arguments that readers may find difficult to
follow.
Second, even when a diagram is worth including, an attorney should
consider whether it is necessary to diagram the entirety of a statutory
sentence. If some words in the sentence are not at issue and their omission
would not change the grammatical relation of those that remain, then the
diagram need not include them. For example, Judge Gorsuch chose to
include in his Rentz diagram only 27 of the 165 words in the statutory
sentence134 being interpreted—just enough to allow the reader to see the
words at issue in a coherent grammatical context without getting bogged
down in irrelevant details. 
131 Lawrence Solan deftly explains this difference between syntactical understanding and semantic understanding. He notes
that if we read the words “the snake crawled into the hole,” we know from childhood, without formal training, that the
sentence is telling us about a subject (the snake), what it did (crawled), and where it did so (into the hole). See SOLAN, supra
note 13, at 94–95. However, this knowledge gets us nowhere in answering questions regarding the exact range of creatures
that may qualify technically as snakes. See id. at 97.
132 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
133 This advice coincides with research indicating that learners who have some prior understanding of the information to be
illustrated by a diagram may not benefit from the addition of a diagram to a textual explanation. See, e.g., Schnotz, supra note
33; Jodi L. Davenport et al., When Do Diagrams Enhance Learning? A Framework for Designing Relevant Representations in 1
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference for the Learning Sciences, 191, 196–97 (2008), available at
https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=VrE-bH4AAAAJ&citation_for_view=VrE-
bH4AAAAJ:9yKSN-GCB0IC (reporting study results showing that diagrams “offered no additional learning benefit for
high-performing students” and speculating that these students “may have [had] the prior knowledge or metacognitive skills
to spontaneously create expert-like mental models from information in the text-base[d] instruction”).
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012); Rentz, 777 F.3d at 1110.
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Third, the style of the diagram in the brief will make a difference.
Given that Reed-Kellogg diagramming has not been widely taught for
decades, many clerks and judges may be unfamiliar with its non–self-
explanatory format. And even those who may remember Reed-Kellogg
diagramming may not recall it fully or fondly.135 For these reasons, a
simpler diagram that includes labels for parts of speech, such as a modern
tree diagram136 or one consisting of boxed text and labels,137 may be more
effective. Of course, the brief writer would need to understand common
grammatical terms in order to insert appropriate labels in the diagram, so
it may be necessary to consult a good reference book on grammar to
confirm or refresh one’s knowledge of the subject.138
Fourth, the position of the diagram within the brief will also make a
difference. Research indicates that diagrams function best when they
appear near,139 and ideally above,140 the relevant explanatory text, so a
diagram will serve little purpose if relegated to an appendix. To avoid the
effect of a diagram coming out of left field, the brief writer could include a
prefatory sentence above the diagram (“This interpretation is buttressed
by the grammatical structure of the statutory text, as shown in the
diagram below.”) and then explain, in sentences below the diagram, how
the diagrammed syntax supports the brief writer’s position. 
Fifth, an attorney should consult local court rules to determine how
the insertion of a diagram may count toward a court’s word-limitation for
briefs. I have yet to find any local rules that specifically address this issue,
and the word-count function of Word 2010 skipped right over all of the
diagram-embedded words in this manuscript. However, if the use of
images that include words eventually becomes common in briefs, courts
may start limiting the permitted amount of images, or words within
images, or both.
135 At least two attorneys have gone on the record in local bar journals regarding their uneasy relationship with sentence
diagramming. See Anthony Abear, Guidance from Those That Came Before Me, 21 DUPAGE CTY. BAR ASS’N BRIEF 9, 9 (Oct.
2008) (“I feared that [my eighth-grade English teacher] would call on me for an answer. I feared even more with dread that I
might be called before the class to stand up at the chalk board and diagram a sentence. Yikes.”); Maureen B. Collins, Back to
the Basics of Grammar and Style, 91 ILL. B.J. 91, 91 (Feb. 2003) (“Does the mention of the word ‘grammar’ bring back frightful
images of nuns with diagrammed sentences? Me too.”). 
136 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
137 An example appears above in the discussion of the Rentz case. See supra section III.B.1.
138 An excellent reference is chapter 8 OF ANNE ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES, JUST WRITING: GRAMMAR,
PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE FOR THE LEGAL WRITER (4th ed. 2013).
139 See Richard E. Mayer & Logan Fiorella, Principles for Reducing Extraneous Processing in Multimedia Learning:
Coherence, Signaling, Redundancy, Spatial Contiguity, and Temporal Contiguity Principles (reviewing multiple studies indi-
cating that placing images near or next to related explanatory text increases learning), in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
MULTIMEDIA LEARNING, supra note 33, at 279, 300–04.
140 See Schnotz, supra note 33, at 90–91.
104 LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 13 / 2016
Last, and perhaps most important, attorneys must remember that
grammar isn’t everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.141 If a
proposed interpretation cuts against the larger context of the statutory
text142 or leads to an absurd result,143 a court will be unlikely to adopt the
interpretation, however diagrammable it may be. Indeed, a misplaced
emphasis on grammar may cause the brief writer to come across like the
understandably single subject of the Luke Surl cartoon below.144
© Luke Surl 2008
On the other hand, when statutory syntax coincides with other
reasons supporting a given interpretation, a brief-writer may further his or
her suit on occasion through the inclusion of a well-designed sentence
diagram. 
141 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., Peterson v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 636 N.W.2d 727, 732 n.7 (Wis. 2001) (“The rules of grammar and punctuation
should not be applied at the expense of a natural, reasonable reading of the statutory language (taking into account the
context in which it appears and the purpose of the statute), or when the result is an expansion or contraction of the statute
contrary to its terms.”).
143 See, e.g., U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (noting that, in statutory interpretation, “absurd results are to be
avoided”). Of course, what is or is not absurd may itself be subject to debate. See Solan, supra note 13, at 51 (critiquing a
federal court’s labeling of a particular statutory interpretation as absurd).
144 Reprinted here under Creative Commons Attribution-non-Commercial-ShareAlike 2.0 UK: England & Wales License,
available at www.lukesurl.com.
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